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Abstract
This study examines the relationship between secular behaviors and religious
behaviors among youth in the United States. While there is no doubt that these two things
are intrinsically linked, the nature of that relationship has been predominantly studied in
the direction of religion affecting secular behavior. However, in today’s society with
secularization and the prevalence of the mass media, it makes more sense to examine the
relationship the opposite way and see how secular behavior affects religiosity. Using the
National Study of Youth and Religion (NSYR) dataset and change in change modeling,
causality can be established showing how behaviors such as drinking, smoking, and
marijuana usage affect religiosity in youth. Smoking had the most wide-reaching effect
on youth religiosity, followed by drinking. Marijuana usage did not seem to affect
religiosity at all. These behaviors are all classified as deviant behaviors though, and while
there are significant relationships between them and religiosity measures, the trends seen
also mimic frequency tables of only the religiosity measures over time, bringing into
doubt just how much change can actually be accounted for by these deviant behaviors.
Non-deviant secular behaviors relating to the vast shifts in lifestyle over the past fifteen
years need to also be examined for their effects on religiosity to see if consumption of
media and popular culture is a bigger culprit of secularization than deviant behavior is
among youth.
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Preface & Introduction
This paper emerged out of an interest in how major societal shifts concerning
popular culture, mass media, and secularization changed the way Americans relate to
religion and navigate religious beliefs and behaviors. Because of these major shifts, the
way that we look at religion may be outdated, and instead of examining causality as
going from religion to the secular, causality may in fact run from the secular to the
religious, meaning that the secular culture we consume affects our religious beliefs and
behaviors. That this reverse causality is real is the main hypothesis of the paper.
The study of religion in the context of sociology and in particular the sociology of
the United States has been a fruitful and enduring area of research among scholars. In
recent years, the question of secularization has become a main focal point, and
researchers have been searching for answers to the questions: is the United States
becoming more secular? and if so, what is causing it? Perhaps some of the debate around
what is causing secularization can be solved if indeed we look at the arrow of causality
the other way around and see that secular behavior is the driving force behind religious
change.
Chapter One of this paper focuses on existing literature on the topic and is split
into three main sections: secularization, mass media and popular culture, and changing
religiosity. Chapter Two offers a look at the methods used to explore this relationship
between the sacred and secular and gives further details about the units of measure used
for each. Chapter Three gives the results of this analysis and Chapter Four offers a
discussion of themes that emerged in the process of analysis. Chapter Five gives some
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conclusions on the study, detailing the significance of the findings, the limitations of the
study, and making some suggestions for further research into the topic.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review
Background
American society is heavily focused on ideas of individualism and personal
autonomy, with its members choosing more often to look at what makes them different
rather than what makes them similar (Smith and Snell 2009: 48). Yet social institutions
are instrumental in dictating behaviors, and the institution of religion in particular not
only dictates proper behavior, but also proper morality. But religious pluralism also leads
to many different versions of what that morality is (Smith and Snell 2009: 50). One
person put it like this: “Being raised in a certain culture you have certain norms for what
are moral…But if someone else is coming with a different perspective, they would maybe
have a different outcome, based on what they believe” (Smith and Snell 2009: 51). It is
apparent through this that individuals can draw their moralities from different sources,
and there is not one common “correct” morality that everyone adheres to.
While religious institutions have served this guiding purpose in the past, the shape
of religion in America is changing. Mainline Protestant denominations in particular are
losing members, but Catholics are experiencing this as well, and those members it does
retain do not rank religion as highly important in their lives as their counterparts in other
Christian denominations such as Evangelical Protestants (Smith and Snell 2009: 96).
Even as people age, which tends to lead to higher degrees of religiosity, trend predictors
indicate that future generations will still be less religious than those before them (Smith
and Snell 2009: 102). This begs the question: what is replacing religion as a moral and
behavioral guide for people in the United States today?
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This paper examines the many factors we must consider when asking this
question, such as overall secularization trends and measures of religiosity, but also the
role of the mass media and popular culture in the lives of people today. Mass media and
popular culture have been on the rise since the mid-20th century, and their ability to
expose and saturate users with a variety of information from different traditions, cultures,
and beliefs could play a key role in explaining where people learn their morality in
modern America and also how the possible shift of power from religion to mass media
affects individual’s religious behaviors.

Secularization
The concept of secularization and worries about its potential effects is nothing
new in the United States. From the Puritan settlers who first came to the country to the
present day, the threat of declining religion has many concerned. But debate continues
about whether or not there is even a phenomenon to get up in arms about or if the patterns
we see regarding things like declining church attendance are inconsequential and possibly
symptomatic of a cyclical relationship with religion (Smith and Snell 2009: 100).
Secularization is broadly defined as a social process through which religion loses
its institutional power over members of a society in both their private and public lives
(Fallding 1974: 212 McCaffree 2017: 133). A few scholars conjecture that
secularization’s roots extend back to the Enlightenment, but many are hesitant to make
that bold of a claim. The majority of scholars do however acknowledge that
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secularization is happening in modern society and particularly in the Christian religious
tradition (McCaffree 2017: 249).
The question of how to accurately measure religion has been discussed and
debated for decades, but in general sociologists have found it is best not to examine the
phenomenon itself, but rather the multifaceted behavior surrounding it. These religious
behaviors contribute to a person’s religiosity, which we can then measure and analyze
(Fichter 1969:169). Religiosity is still difficult to measure, however, due to the large
degree of change in societal norms that we have experienced in the past several decades.
Measures of religiosity from the 1960s may say support for birth control constitutes weak
religiosity, whereas measures from the 2000s may say just the opposite due to a shift in
societal values and ideas on what makes a good religious person (Fichter 1969: 170).
According to the General Social Survey (GSS) religious affiliation is in mild
decline throughout all branches of Christianity, although Evangelical Protestants are
faring better than both Mainline Protestants and Catholics in regards to membership (GSS
2017). Judaism and other minority religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism, however,
are experiencing an increased presence in the population, with membership numbers
steadily increasing (GSS 2017). Looking at these trends, one might assume that
secularization is not a major influence on American religion today, but when speaking
about secularization it is most important to look at the fastest growing religious affiliation
in the United States: no religion at all. People with no religion constitute the fastest
growing demographic in the landscape of American religion, growing from just 14% of
the population in the year 2000 to 22% in 2016. While over half of Americans still
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believe in God with no doubts and the level of prayer has remained fairly consistent
throughout the years, the public religious behaviors of many people have also been
declining over the years. In 2004 only 15% of respondents said they never attended
religious services, a number which dramatically increased to 25% in 2016 and 58% said
that they either had a weak affiliation to their religion or no affiliation at all (GSS 2017).
But it can be difficult to look at precisely what the process of secularization has
looked like in the United States, as it has not been a linear process throughout the years.
Periods of intense religious revival have occurred, generally in response to some outside
social or economic crisis, but these spikes in religiosity are the exception rather than the
rule, and soon continue their downward trend once more (McCaffree 2017: 1). In fact,
while economic crisis can be cited as a reason for increased religiosity, a steady economy
may work in the opposite direction, driving religion downward. According to McCaffree,
it is people living steady economic and social lives with access to good education and the
internet that are driving secularization in America (2017:1).
Many scholars suggest that higher education in particular was having a
secularizing effect on young men and women in the United States (Uecker, Regnerus, and
Vaaler 2007: 1668). Data from the General Social Survey (GSS) did in fact show a linear
association between education and apostasy, leading researchers to theorize that higher
education led to a decline in religiosity due to increased exposure to different and perhaps
countercultural views (Uecker, Regnerus, and Vaaler 2007: 1669). Many believe that this
is the reason Protestants, who are traditionally better educated, are also experiencing
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greater declines in religious membership and participation than Catholics or Orthodox
Christians (Uecker, Regnerus, and Vaaler 2007: 1669).
But education is not the only secularizing force scholars of religion have
examined. While some research suggests that religiosity may be inherited from parents or
other influential figures in early life, most scholars refute this, however, pointing to
trends such as Mainline Protestant children being much more likely to lose their
religiosity and affiliation than children raised in the Evangelical tradition (Regnerus,
Smith, and Frisch 2003: 10). Other factors that may contribute to this decline in
religiosity are the strength of relationships with pastors, opportunities for religious
involvement, and the influence of both peer groups and the mass media (Regnerus,
Smith, and Frisch 2003: 12). Another cause may be that religious youth and young adults
are more likely to blame God for negative events in their life and in the world, which may
push them away from religion (Regnerus, Smith, and Frisch 2003: 14). This is an
example of reconciling cognitive dissonance, which is defined as “the gap between what
they [people] are doing and what they think they ought to be doing” (Uecker, Regnerus,
and Vaaler 2007: 1670). Growing up in a tradition with a loving god and then being faced
with negative and traumatic events are two things that run contrary to one another, and
therefore the individual’s belief in one has to decline. It seems that a majority of the time,
the thing that declines is religiosity. Evidence has also emerged that belief in the devil has
no effect on youth and young adult’s likelihood to perform delinquent acts (Regnerus,
Smith, and Frisch 2003: 27).
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Scholars point to these traumatic events as what is driving the trend of
secularization. Mike King (2009) talks about secularization stemming from the 9/11
terrorist attacks, saying that the trauma and outrage directed at the religious extremists
who carried out the attacks caused “the ‘mutual ignorance pact’ between secular culture
and faith tradition” to break down (5). What this argument means is that religion is no
longer popularly viewed as a quaint and polite aspect of society, but rather one that can
threaten the stability of society as a whole and therefore is being displaced from political
and media spheres in an attempt to decrease its power and influence (King 2009: 6).
Much of this theory has to do with the media and the changing ways we socialize
and interact with one another in modern society. In the theory of the Multidimensional
Self, forces acting upon the individual begin with the individual themselves, then moves
to their family and friends, community, and society respectively in concentric circles
(McCaffree 2017: 175). This manner of thinking may be getting outdated however,
particularly with the rise of the internet and mass media and particularly of portable
personal devices with which they can be easily accessed. Through these things such as
cell phones, computers, and tablets, society — and even typically underground deviant
sections of society such as White Nationalist Movements, Ecoterrorists, and a myriad of
other extremist groups — have an easy, accessible way to cut through all the intervening
circles and directly influence the individual. For example, research has been done on how
increased online pornography usage is driving religiosity down in youth and young adults
in the United States (Perry and Hayward 2017). Pornography is still considered deviant
within modern society, but the ease of access to it through the internet makes it more
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likely that an individual can either passively or actively encounter it in their everyday
lives. Data seem to suggest that this more normalized exposure is actually causing youth
to decrease their religiosity in an attempt to reconcile the cognitive dissonance appearing
from the conflict between their religious values and those in larger society that say
pornography viewing is not the great evil the church makes it out to be and in turn
decrease their moral engagement based on their religion (Perry and Hayward 2017:
1763). This demonstrates the increased importance of larger society in an individual’s life
and behavior, and shows that in an increasingly secular society it is logical that there
would also be an increasing secularizing effect on individuals within that society.
This raises the question of what specific social institutions fill the space in
people’s behavior and attitudes that religion has deserted. Many people are reluctant to
completely abandon all semblance of religion, taking comfort in the familiar beliefs and
perhaps benefiting from them in the sense that it give some sense of direction and
purpose in a person’s life as well as easy guidelines for “proper” morality (McCaffree
2017: 130). But individual’s religious behavior such as church attendance, daily prayer,
and specific religious affiliation all are declining (McCaffree 2017: 132). In the past,
these religious behaviors were what conditioned member’s behaviors in the secular world
beyond church walls and losing this influence greatly decreased the role of the church as
an institution in people’s lives.
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Mass Media and Popular Culture
People’s social circles and resources used to be limited in a way that is hard for us
to comprehend now. In the past century, the way we interact with one another and the
world at large has changed dramatically, with small communities and limited access to
knowledge giving way before the force of mass media such as the radio and television,
which have connected people across a broad spectrum and also made a plethora of
information available to almost anyone, and even in the mid-1950s scholars were
discussing the power of mass media to affect communities (Nature 1954: 345). This
exposure to new ideas and information has especially become influential in the age of the
internet, where anything you want to know is accessible at your fingertips (Bagdikian
2007: 2). The way Americans view religion has also changed, with society shifting
towards a greater degree of societal differentiation, or change in the ways people process
and display public and private religiosity, turning public religion into a phenomenon
connected primarily to social institutions such as churches and keeping private religiosity
only loosely connected to an individual’s public life in society (Jindra 2000: 167). This
explains why in the GSS trend data, religious behaviors such as prayer, which are private
and most often carried out in an individual’s home have remained constant throughout the
years, while more public displays of religion such as attending religious services has
declined (GSS 2017).
Before radio was popularized, people received much of their information, and
certainly a majority of their moral information, from the church that they belonged to.
That began to change when radio and television took center stage in American life in the
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20th century, however, and mass media in particular became a key force in determining
collective community consciousness, which in turn dictates socially agreed upon morality
(Gabel 2011: 51). Three of the strongest socializing institutions in modern American
society are schools, the family, and the mass media (Smith et al 2011: 62). In terms of
morality, mass media is by far the most saturated and diverse of these institutions, with
access to a wide variety of world views and moral guidelines available at the click of a
button (Smith et all 2011 :64). While some religious institutions have chosen to rebel
against this mass media infringement on what is traditionally their territory — think of
the Amish for example — completely removing oneself from the discourse prevents a
healthy dialogue and level of awareness between the group and society at large, which
can be quite damaging to a group (Gabel 2011: 52).
Religious groups have come to find that even if they try to stay away from the
mass media and keep it out of their day to day business, the media finds a way of
involving itself. Despite the Catholic Church’s best efforts, the news of the massive
number of priests repeatedly involved in the sexual assault of children in their parishes
got out to the media and was instantly published all over newspapers, radio, and
television (Carroll et al. 2002). People came forward with their own stories and even now
fifteen years later it is still a widely known event, having just been the inspiration for an
Oscar Winning film, and paints people’s understandings of the Catholic Church as a
whole. Other media focusing on religious controversies have also surfaced, with one such
production being the 2006 documentary Jesus Camp, whose depictions of what some
viewed as the radicalization of evangelical Christian youth did not sit well with many
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viewers who found its content disturbing and wrong (Ewing and Grady 2006; Hesse
2016: 1). In response to Jesus Camp, one child psychologist said that “One of the
problems with faith-based teaching is it teaches children not to trust their own reason and
intuition, undermining their ability to have confidence in their own knowledge and
ability… There is a lot of psychological damage that follows when people are trained not
to trust themselves” (Hesse 2016). Her opinions that the way the children depicted in the
film were being treated was borderline child abuse was echoed in many audience
members of the film, and collectively raised eyes at the Evangelical Christian tradition
(Hesse 2016).
These jarring images and stories of religion and the abuse of power prevalent in
certain churches and faith traditions created a stir among the American public in a way
that would not have been possible without the existence of a distribution system like mass
media, which flung every controversial statement and opinion out into the world for
everyone to find. Unlike in prior years where such scandals could have been easily
contained, there was no stopping the newspapers, radios, televisions, and laptops from
opening up all the dirty laundry the church had tried to sweep under the rug. It seemed at
this point inevitable that people began falling away from the church as a primary
institution in their lives, and specifically as a moral guidepost, which many people saw as
a ridiculous notion given the information on moral corruption and sin in the church that
mass media had exposed.
So if people cannot get those moral beliefs from their religious institution, where
can they get them from? The answer became mass media programming, and specifically
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television programming, both fictional and based in reality and competition. Joyce Carol
Oates observes: “The decline of religion as a source of significant meaning in modern
industrialized societies has been extravagantly compensated by the rise of popular culture
in general, of which the billion-dollar sports mania is the most visible manifestation” (as
quoted in Price 2000: 202).
The National Football League and other professional sports leagues became major
cultural touchstones among the American public, with fans of different teams sorting
themselves out into sometimes fanatical groups with their own uniforms and traditions,
forming what some scholars have called a civil or folk religion (Price 2000: 203). Price
writes that: “For tens of millions of devoted fans throughout the country, sports constitute
a popular form of religion by shaping their world and sustaining their ways of engaging
it” (2000: 202). Why it is classified as a civil religion is that sports teams and leagues
adhere to a notable number of religious markers: it has a deity, authority, tradition,
beliefs, faithful followers, ritual sites, and material elements (Price 2000: 204). They also
demand their adherents meet high standards of expectation, are disciplined, and look to
achieve perfection whenever possible, which are values often echoed in religious
traditions (Price 2000: 207).
Also notable is the timing of when major competitions, especially in football, are
held. Most everyone, if not everyone in the United States, knows about Sunday Night
Football, which usually is comprised of the biggest and most anticipated matches of the
week (Price 2000: 204). This trend of sport’s matches taking over the Sunday religious
day began gaining prominence in the mid 1970s, with one expert noting that “the
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churches have ceded Sunday to sports…Sport owns Sunday now, and religion is content
to leave a few minutes before the big games” (Price 2000: 204). Sports became a major
point of social cohesion among the American public due to their continuing popularity,
but sports were not the only mass media program that truly captured the religious fervor
of the populace by giving them religious guideposts in a non-religious institution that
they needed after splitting with what they see as a morally corrupt church.
Science Fiction is known for having an enthusiastic and engaged audience, but
perhaps no science fiction program has been able to capture the hearts and minds of its
fans like Star Trek in its many iterations. The Trek fandom is in its own way a “New age”
movement, with a small intimate network held together by commercialization (think of
all the fan conventions that take place annually around the United States such as
ComicCon) and shown in popular culture (Jindra 2000: 168). Jindra (2000) notes that
Star Trek shares many similarities with more conventional religious movements: there is
“an origin myth, a set of beliefs, organizations, and some of the most active and creative
members found anywhere” (167). He also equates the stigma directed at Star Trek fans in
particular by the rest of society to persecution experienced by other religious groups
throughout history, further entrenching this movement that grew out of a pop culture
television show as a religious entity (Jindra 2000: 167). Jindra (2000) argues that the
appeal of Star Trek as a religion is its positive view of the future where many problems
faced by society today such as poverty, war, and disease have been completely eliminated
and we live in not only a post-racial society but a society in which even differences of
species are inconsequential, and the emphasis is placed on exploring the stars in pursuit
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of knowledge, guided by logic, science, and technology rather than faulty emotion or
bigotry (169).
It is only logical that this utopian view of the future would capture the
imaginations and hearts of people, and it certainly has been shown to do just that. Star
Trek fan conventions have been taking place since 1972, over the last 30 years the Star
Trek franchise has sold over 2 billion dollars in merchandise, several dictionaries of the
alien languages from the show have been created and sold commercially, and fans
themselves are engaged in creating magazines, clubs, and role-playing opportunities
(Jindra 2000: 166). These clubs are in many ways the congregations of the Star Trek civil
religion, with ranks modeled after the show (Ensign for the newest members, Captain for
the oldest and most involved) bestowed upon members based on involvement and
members referring to one another as family and describing themselves as incredibly close
and sometimes even closer than biological family would be (Jindra 2000: 171).
Fans of the show also have seen it have a real and profound effect not only on
their economic behavior but on their social behavior as well. Fans have noted the show as
a catalyst for choosing courses of study in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and
Mathematics) fields and also leading them to actively take control of their lives and
participate in community service projects organized by the local Star Trek fan clubs that
they belong to (Jindra 2000: 171, 173). One fan notes that Star Trek is not necessarily
about a television series, but that it is rather about “faith in our future” (Jindra 2000: 174).
As to why Star Trek and science fiction in general seems to have such an enduring
appeal, Jindra notes American’s tendency to be very forward thinking and always have
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their eyes set on the next unknown, such as during the space race where the country was
enthralled by the idea of getting to the moon (2000: 176). Science fiction is by nature
very forward looking — always imagining humanity’s next step and next iteration, where
as organized religion, to many Trek fans, is seen as being somewhat traditionalist and not
exciting or useful in the same way that the ideals presented in Star Trek are, and that
without traditional religion fulfilling that forward-thinking desire that many people have
pop culture has to step in and do it instead (Jindra 2000: 176).
Mass media does not only provide alternate forms of religion or “civil religion” to
replace perceived morally corrupt and backwards thinking denominations, it also
provides a place for the de-sacrification of religion itself. Since the early years, television
in particular has been taking religious and especially Christian, iconography and holidays
and turning them into secular, capitalist spectacles and ventures. Many popular television
shows and movies such as Monty Python’s Life of Brian, South Park, Bruce Almighty,
and The Good Place, have used religion as a source of material and turned it into a joke
or a humorous quirk rather than something sacred that should be taken seriously. Monty
Python’s Life of Brian in particular experienced severe backlash at the time of its release,
with the film even being banned in several countries and publicly condemned as
blasphemy by the Catholic Church (Roche 2011). But comedians in particular still
experience threats concerning possible blasphemy in their work to this day. The South
Park creators have received death threats for their depictions of religion, as has David
Letterman, and cartoonists have come under fire for images depicting the prophet

!17

Mohammed (Roche 2011). However, the sheer volume of popular culture content
mocking or making light of religion has normalized it to a degree in society.
One aspect of pop culture and the mass media that hasn’t been discussed up to
this point is that of music. Music is highly influential and permeates our entire society
(Wallis 2011: 160), from stores to elevators to radio and homes. Music is everywhere and
therefore has a lot of power in forming people’s opinions about religion. Music videos in
particular, due to their dynamic nature of being both sound and visual based can speak
multitudes about religion and religious iconography, and because of the nature of pop
culture, secularize those images by treating them as inspiration for secular works rather
than sacred images reserved for sacred settings.
Madonna is one notable example of a musical artist littering her music with
religious themes and iconography. Her music video for “Like A Prayer” featured her
positioned in front of burning crosses and also used Catholic symbols such as stigmata
and liturgical words, which are seen as holy, in the context of sexual desire and violence
(Lambert 1989). The Vatican was outraged over this and publicly condemned the video,
also using its network to boycott all Pepsi products after the company used the song in its
advertisements. But even the fact that a major corporation such as Pepsi would use the
song despite its religious controversy shows that religion as an institution has very little
control in modern times over the secular world around it.
In more recent years, Lady Gaga has also faced backlash for religious
iconography in her music videos, specifically her video “Alejandro,” which garnered
criticisms of blasphemy from the Catholic League (Donohue 2010). In the video, Gaga
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wears a red latex habit in the style of a Catholic Nun and eats a set of rosary beads, which
was the source of much of the outrage (RedOne and Lady Gaga 2010). Bill Donohue
(2010) described Lady Gaga in the music video as a “Madonna copy cat [who] has now
become the new poster girl for American decadence and Catholic bashing, sans the looks
and talent of her role model” (1). Nonetheless, the music video has been viewed over 322
million times on YouTube and was popular despite having its detractors (RedOne and
Lady Gaga 2010).
The Christian church has even to a substantial degree lost control of the secular
world in regards to its most important holiday: Christmas. Network programming around
Christmas time can often only be identified as religious through its use of hymns and
hymn lyrics for music, but other than that any religious undertones are kept firmly as
undertones (Thompson 2000: 48). Christmas television specials like the kind seen on the
Hallmark channel are a staple of the holiday season, but many producers and
screenwriters are very cautious so as not to offend and alienate non-Christian audiences
(Thompson 2000: 48). They do this through use of non-religious but seasonal characters
such as Santa Claus, Rudolph, and Frosty the Snow Man and allowing viewers to read a
religious theme within the secular movies and television shows they produce (Thompson
2000: 48).
But nonetheless, Christmas is a Christian holiday, and Christianity as a religion
does not lend itself well to the hyper consumption that retailers and other mass media
outlets want consumers to buy into during the holiday season. Christianity itself rejects
visible wealth and consumption and places an emphasis on humble living, but Christmas
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specials themselves have found a way around this by choosing to emphasize instead the
nostalgic themes of home, family, and generosity that are commonly associated with the
image of the good Christian family from the 1950s (Thompson 2000: 48-49). The goal of
bringing out these themes, some argue, is to create a sense of guilt in the consumer that
their lives do not measure up to the themes and influence them to go shopping in an
attempt to prove their closeness to their family as well as their generosity (Thompson
2000: 49).
The idea of generosity in Christmas Specials has especially been associated with
the idea of presents, which are a purely capitalistic theme throughout the holiday season
(Thompson 2000: 50). Gifts or the lack thereof are emphasized throughout almost every
Christmas special: from Santa bringing presents to good boys and girls, to Scrooge
withholding presents from his deserving worker, to even the Three Magi bringing baby
Jesus gifts while he is in the manger, gifts are an inescapable part of the pop culture
Christmas landscape (Thompson 2000: 50). Advertisers use this emphasis on gifts and
generosity to further guilt consumers into spending, using lines such as “When You Care
Enough to Send the Very Best,” which of course implies that if you do not gift your loved
ones that specific present you do not care enough about them to send them the best,
which leads to feelings of guilt (Thompson 2000: 51).
This secularization of Christianity’s most sacred holiday through the mass media
in pop culture demonstrates the scale of the phenomenon that is mass media’s influence
on religion and people’s values. While people may become outraged at the idea of a
comedy special poking fun at religion, they are equally if not more likely to become
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outraged when the media exposes them to a tell-all about the improprieties and criminal
actions that their church has been complicit in over the span of many years. This
challenge to the morality of the church itself combined with the secularizing of the sacred
sphere in popular culture has led to a decreased influence that religion has over its
adherents and society as a whole, with pop culture and the mass media more than willing
to step in with a moral replacement as the religious institution falters.

Changing Religiosity
Cognitive dissonance and deviance are interesting factors when considering
declining religiosity, particularly among youth in the United States. Scholars have
theorized that religious socialization and activities would lead to greater development of
self control and therefore a decline in deviant behavior (Desmond, Ulmer, and Bader
2013: 385) due to the fact that religious organizations are an external source of discipline
(Desmond, Ulmer, and Bader 2013: 386). Another way this was hypothesized was that
religiosity can act as a balance for poor self control by increasing desire to have self
control so an individual could live up to the ethical standards demanded of them from
their religious beliefs (Desmond, Ulmer, and Bader 2013: 388). Indeed, the study found
that religiosity and self control both reduce deviant behavior such as marijuana use and
underage drinking, but they could not determine a significant causal relationship between
religiosity and degrees of self control when related to deviant behavior, as the results
were found to be substantively the same between the first and second waves of data
(Desmond, Ulmer, and Bader 2013: 400).
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This is somewhat surprising, as one would assume religious teachings that steer
youth away from behaviors such as underage drinking would have more of an effect on
their actual behavior, but the evidence does not support this and therefore there must be
some internal justification for their behavior going on in the youth’s minds. The
relationship makes more sense when other research showed that deviance was having a
more profound effect on religion and religiosity in youth than religion was having on
deviance (Matsueda 1989: 446). This trend extends beyond just youth as well. For
example, 42% of Mormons who no longer attended church reported that their lifestyles
had changed to the point where it was no longer compatible with participation in the
church and cited that as their reason for disengagement (Uecker, Regnerus, and Vaaler
2007: 1670). This is a powerful example of reconciling cognitive dissonance between
religious tradition and value and secular lifestyle, and in the end secular lifestyle seemed
to be the more dominant factor.
Another example of this phenomenon is a test of cognitive dissonance that found
a variety of delinquent and deviant behaviors including drug use, which is often viewed
as more severe than alcohol consumption and abuse, can predict declining religiosity and
increasing secularization amongst users (Uecker, Regnerus, and Vaaler 2007: 1671). This
may be due to the fact that religious traditions are more severely opposed to drug usage
than they are to alcohol use, which increases the cognitive dissonance for those who
identify as religious but also use drugs, and therefore increases the likelihood that they
will abandon or diminish their religious beliefs to suit their drug behaviors (Uecker,
Regnerus, and Vaaler 2007: 1671).
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So while secular factors seem to have an entirely negative effect on an
individual’s religiosity, there are some secular factors that seem to increase religiosity at
least for certain groups. These include marriage, which has been shown to increase
religiosity in men but have no culpable effect on the religiosity of women (Uecker,
Regnerus, and Vaaler 2007: 1671), as well as parental status, as parents of all ages have
been shown to have higher degrees of religiosity than non-parents (Uecker, Regnerus,
and Vaaler 2007: 1672).
But as the GSS shows through the decline of Mainline Protestant and Catholic
membership, strong parental religiosity is not an overly strong predictor of their
children’s religiosity (GSS 2017). Pornography is a good example of the effects of
cognitive dissonance on declining religiosity in youth, particularly among males.
Sexuality is one of the most discussed and regulated aspects of religious life, and
deviance from prescribed norms on sexuality, such as cohabitation with a partner rather
than pursuing marriage, has been shown to be very damaging to individual’s religiosity
(Uecker, Regnerus, and Vaaler 2007: 1672). Pornography is generally acknowledged
across religious groups as immoral behavior, and yet that does not stop religious people
from consuming it. GSS data from 2008-2012 show that 62% of men and 36% of women
between the ages of 18 and 26 reported watching at least one pornographic movie or
video in the past year (Perry and Hayward 2017: 1757-1758). Data drawn in 2010 by
another study said that of religious young men who reported watching pornography, 8.6%
reported watching pornography a few times a month and 8.6% reported watching it daily
or every other day, despite every one of those men also reporting that they believed
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watching pornography was morally wrong (Nelson, Padilla-Walker, and Carroll 2010:
140). These young men also reported lower levels of self-worth and higher levels of
depression than their peers who did not report watching pornography, which may be a
manifestation of the cognitive dissonance that manifests between their pornography
habits and their belief that pornography is wrong (Nelson, Padilla-Walker, and Carroll
2010: 144).
Perry and Hayward’s (2017) study delved deeper into attitudes about pornography
and the effects of viewing it on adolescents and young adults. The conclusions from their
study show that pornography’s effect on religion is consistent across gender and has the
strongest effects on importance of faith, closeness to God, and religious doubts during the
respondent’s early teenage years (1758). Research has also suggested that many people
rationalize their pornography usage as being preferable to sexual promiscuity, and
thereby legitimize their consumption of it despite their religious belief saying it is
morally wrong (Perry and Hayward 2017: 1760). Perry and Hayward (2017) reclassify
this cognitive dissonance as scrupulosity, which they define as “a psychological disorder
characterized by pathological guilt, often stemming from violations of deeply held
religious convictions” (1761). They claim that in order to minimize this guilt, adolescents
decrease their religious convictions so that they no longer are dissonant with their secular
behaviors, which is also classified as moral disengagement (Perry and Hayward 2017:
1762). They also looked towards the future of religiosity in America, concluding that if
pornography, as it seems to, decreases religious attachment and more and more people
are being exposed to pornography at younger ages, then there is likely to be a drop in
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both institutional and personal religiosity amongst those age cohorts (Perry and Hayward
2017: 1776).
While religiosity itself is still very tricky to accurately measure, especially
through quantitative means because of issues of construct validity and debate over
whether religiosity is truly being measured at all, compelling research seems to show that
religiosity is declining in America due to a combination of several different secular
factors. With increased moral disengagement from religion, people are beginning to turn
towards other sources in culture and perhaps increasingly their own internal moralities
and behaviors that are independent of any institutional influence to decide what they
believe is right and wrong and how they will implement those beliefs into their daily
routines.

Conclusion
The real question to be asked when looking at secularization, mass media and
popular culture, and religiosity is one of directionality. While much of the research on
secularization focuses on how secular society has diminished religious behaviors among
Americans, research on religiosity runs in the opposite direction, focusing on physical,
observable manifestations of religious belief in individual’s lives with little regard to the
secular forces acting upon them in conjunction with the religious forces. But attention has
now begun to be devoted in the opposite direction to how individuals tailor their religious
lifestyles to fit their secular beliefs and behaviors.
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There is a gap in the literature though suggesting opposite directionality, where
individual’s secular lifestyles are what influences their religious beliefs and behaviors.
While some research has been done in this area (see: Perry and Hayward 2017), it is still
relatively new and minimal, and also examines very small and specific secular factors
that may influence religious beliefs such as pornography and recreational drug usage. The
idea that mass media and pop culture are in fact what develops moral beliefs in
individuals and that they in turn tailor their religious behaviors to fit those secular beliefs
is one that has not been explored in a general sense at all, which is what this paper seeks
to examine and explain.
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Chapter 2: Methods
This paper uses data from the first three waves of the National Study of Youth and
Religion (NSYR). The NSYR is a nationally representative, longitudinal telephone
survey. Wave I took place in 2003, Wave II in 2005, and Wave III in 2007-2008. In Wave
I respondents were between the ages of 12 and 18. In Wave II they were between 16 and
21, and in Wave III the age range was between 18-24. This makes the data incredibly
useful for tracking changes in religiosity through the formative adolescent years and into
young adulthood. Other demographic information such as gender, race, and education
level can be seen below. It should be noted that gender in Wave I was reported by the
parents of the respondents, and in Wave II and Wave III it was reported by the
respondents themselves.
Gender Frequencies
Wave I

Wave II

Wave III

Male

50.4%

49.5%

48.7%

Female

49.6%

50.5%

51.3%

Race Frequencies
White

63.9%

Black

16.6%

Other

19.5%
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Education Frequencies
Wave I

Wave II

Wave III

Less than High School

31.0%

1.2%

1.1%

Some High School

57.9%

49.1%

15.2%

High School Diploma

9.3%

27.2%

35.9%

Vocational/Tech School

0.0%

1.1%

1.7%

Some College

0.2%

21.1%

40.8%

College Degree

0.0%

0.1%

5.3%

* Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding

The data from these three waves were retrieved from the Association of Religious
Data Archives (ARDA) website in the form of IBM SPSS files. These three waves were
then compiled into a single SPSS file and analyzed. Some variables that were analyzed
were recoded for concision, clarity, and to establish consistency of measure across the
different Waves.
Secular variables that were used in this analysis were DRINK (how often do you
drink alcohol not at religious services?), SMOKE (do you smoke cigarettes regularly?),
and POT (how often, if ever, have you used marijuana). All three of these variables were
present across all three Waves and therefore could be used in establishing causality.
Religious variables used included SPIRITUA (Some people say that they are
"spiritual but not religious.” How true or not would you say that is of you..),
GODCLOSE (How distant or close do you feel to God most of the time?), OKAYPICK
(Some people think that it is okay to pick and choose their religious beliefs without
having to accept the teachings of their religious faith as a whole. Do you agree or
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disagree?), FAITH1 (How important or unimportant is religious faith in shaping how you
live your daily life?), MORALREL (Some people say that morals are relative, that there
are no definite rights and wrongs for everybody. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree,
or strongly disagree?), RELPRVT (Religion is a private matter that should be kept out of
public debates about social and political issues. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or
strongly disagree?), MORALCHNG (Some people say that the world is always changing
and we should adjust our views of what is morally right and wrong to reflect those
changes. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?), and
UNMARSEX (It is alright for two unmarried people who are not in love to have sex. Do
you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?).
To establish causality, a change-in-change method was used to compare various
secular behaviors to measures of religiosity. Each of the secular variables used in this
analysis (DRINK, SMOKE, and POT) was defined as the independent variable and was
recoded into a new variable to show change in behavior between Wave I and Wave II.
Religiosity variables were defined as the dependent variable and were recoded into a new
variable to show change between Wave II and Wave III.
DRINK was originally coded as 1 (drink once a day or more), 2 (drink a few
times a week), 3 (drink about once a week), 4 (drink a few times a month), 5 (drink about
once a month), 6 (drink a few times a year), and 7 (never drink). A new variable was then
computed by taking DRINK - DRINK_w2 and was coded as DRINK_1_2_chng. This is
the variable used in the change in change model. The more negative the number in this
model, the less a respondent drank in Wave II compared to Wave I.
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SMOKE was similarly recoded into SMOKE_1_2_recode by taking SMOKE SMOKE2. In SMOKE_1_2_recode, -1 indicates that the respondent stopped smoking
between Wave I and Wave II, 0 indicates no change in smoking habits, and 1 indicates
that the respondent stopped smoking between Wave I and Wave II.
POT was also recoded into POT_1_2_change, where -1 indicated that the
respondent has stopped using marijuana between Wave I and Wave II, 0 indicating no
change in behavior, and 1 indicating that the respondent has begun using marijuana
between Wave I and Wave II.
FAITH1 was coded from 1 (extremely important) to 5 (not important at all), and
when calculated into FAITH1_2_3_change, the more negative the number the more
importance of faith diminished over time. MORALCHG_2_3_change,
MORALREL_2_3_change, and UNMARSEX_2_3_chng were all coded from 1 (strongly
agree) to 4 (strongly disagree), and when recoded into their change in change model
variables, the more negative the category the more they grew to disagree with the
question being posed.
Each of the relationships included in the Results section was significant at the .05
level. Relationships that were not significant are not included but may be discussed.

!30

Chapter 3: Results

Frequencies
Using the National Study of Youth and Religion (NSYR), eight religious variables
and three secular variables were examined in change-in-change models to allow
theorizing about causality. Two more secular variables were used in cross-sectional
analysis with the same eight religious variables in order to see whether or not there were
relationships between non-deviant secular behavior and religiosity. The results of these
cross tabulations were analyzed to see whether or not secular behavior is responsible for
driving down religious behavior. Frequency tables for each of the religiosity variables
across all three waves of data are included below.

FAITH1 Frequencies
Wave I

Wave II

Wave III

Extremely Important

19.2%

18.7%

18.7%

Very Important

30.5%

25.7%

23.9%

Somewhat Important

32.1%

30.3%

29.4%

Not Very Important

11.2%

14.2%

14.6%

Not Important At All

7.0%

11.1%

13.3%

SPIRITUA Frequencies
Wave I

Wave II

Wave III

9.3%

11.7%

15.6%

Somewhat True

47.2%

48.3%

45.4%

Not True at All

43.5%

40.0%

39.1%

Very True
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GODCLOSE Frequencies
Wave I

Wave II

Wave III

Extremely Distant

3.3%

4.2%

5.2%

Very Distant

4.8%

7.9%

8.2%

Somewhat Distant

17.9%

23.4%

23.2%

Somewhat Close

36.0%

35.5%

34.2%

Very Close

25.7%

21.0%

21.1%

Extremely Close

12.3%

8.1%

8.1%

OKAYPICK Frequencies
Wave I

Wave II

Wave III

Yes

47.8%

49.5%

52.2%

No

52.2%

50.5%

47.8%

MORALREL Frequencies
Wave I

Wave II

Wave III

Yes

47.7%

58.2%

48.1%

No

52.3%

41.8%

51.9%

RELPRVT Frequencies
Wave I

Wave II

Wave III

Strongly Agree

N/A

14.6%

18.3%

Agree

N/A

42.8%

42.6%

Disagree

N/A

33.3%

30.9%

Strongly Disagree

N/A

9.4%

8.2%
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MORALCHNG Frequencies
Wave I

Wave II

Wave III

Strongly Agree

N/A

10.8%

9.9%

Agree

N/A

51.1%

53.4%

Disagree

N/A

28.1%

27.8%

Strongly Disagree

N/A

10.1%

8.9%

UNMARSEX Frequencies
Wave I

Wave II

Wave III

Strongly Agree

N/A

6.3%

7.9%

Agree

N/A

46.8%

51.5%

Disagree

N/A

34.4%

30.9%

Strongly Disagree

N/A

12.5%

9.7%

Change in Change Models
Of the eight religious variables, two had significant relationships with change in
drinking habits at the .05 level, and four had significant relationships with change in
smoking habits at the .05 level. None of the religious variables were significantly related
to marijuana usage. Variables were recoded to remain consistent across the three Waves.

Alcohol
The first religious variable that was significantly related to a change in alcohol
usage was a measure of faith that asked respondents “How important or unimportant is
religious faith in shaping how you live your daily life?” Analysis showed that importance
of faith in daily life and change in drinking habits had a chi-square value of .000 with
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2,241 valid cases. Somewhat surprisingly, although the highest concentration of answers
indicated no change in importance of faith based on change in drinking habits, those who
reported drinking less were almost all more likely to indicate faith becoming less
important to them over time. Those who reported drinking more tended to be more evenly
split between faith becoming more or less important to them, and respondents who fall
into category 4 (drank substantially more) or 5 (drank significantly more) were the only
groups where the majority of respondents who reported a change in their religiosity said
that faith had become more important to them over time. The data are shown in the table
below.

more important

less important

drank less
drank more

!34

!35

Second, respondent’s change in drinking habits was also significant with change in their
opinions on whether or not morality should adjust to a changing world, with a chi-square
value of .005 and 2,195 valid cases. Once again the mode for each secular value was 0,
which indicates no change in their religiosity over time, and almost every group was
more likely to agree or strongly agree that morality should adjust to a changing world. It
was only when respondents drank more over time that this started to shift, and
respondents in category 4 (drank substantially more) were likely to disagree that morality
should change, and those in category 6 (went from never drinking to drinking once a day
or more) were evenly split between agreeing and disagreeing. These data are on the next
page.

agree more

disagree more

drank less
drank more
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Smoking
These two values of religiosity, change in importance of faith and opinions on
morality changing with the world, which were significantly related to change in drinking
habits, were also significantly related to change in smoking habits. In addition, change in
smoking habits were also shown to be significant with change in opinions on whether
morality was relative and change in acceptance of unmarried sex.
First, change in smoking habits and change in importance of faith to daily life had
a relationship with a chi-square value of .000 and 2,242 valid cases. The mode for those
who began smoking, stopped smoking, and whose habits remained consistent were all 0,
which indicates no change in their religiosity measure. After that, respondents who
started smoking were slightly more likely to say faith was more important to them and
those who stopped smoking were the same. The only group who was more likely to say
faith had become less important to their everyday lives was the group whose smoking
habits did not change between Wave I and Wave II.
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stopped

more important

less important

started

Second, the mode in the relationship between change in smoking habits and
change in opinions on whether or not morality should adjust to modern society was also
0, meaning no change. These variables had a chi-square value of .000 and 2,915 valid
cases. Again, the odd group out was those who had no change in their smoking habits.
Both those who began smoking and stopped smoking between Wave I and Wave II were
more likely to disagree that morality should change with a changing world. Only those
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whose habits did not change were more likely to agree that morality should shift than
disagree.
stopped

agree more

disagree more

started

Third, change in smoking habits and change in opinions on whether morality was
relative had a chi-square value of .006 and 1,357 valid cases. For those who started
smoking and whose smoking habits did not change, the mode was no change in
religiosity, but for those who stopped smoking, the mode was both no change and slightly
disagreeing that morality is relative. They are also only half as likely to agree that
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morality is relative than they are to disagree. This is different from the other two
categories, both of whom were more likely to agree than disagree that morality is relative.
stopped

agree more

disagree more

started

Finally, change in smoking habits and change in opinions about unmarried sex
had a chi-square value of .005 with 2,205 valid cases. Once again, the mode was 0, which
indicates no change in religiosity over time, and all categories of respondents were more
likely to agree that unmarried sex between two people who are not in love is acceptable.
Although they all were more likely to agree that unmarried sex is fine, those who started
smoking were least likely to approve of the three groups, followed by those whose
smoking habits did not change. Respondents who stopped smoking were the most likely
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to agree that unmarried sex is alright. This runs contrary to what many people think about
deviant behavior and its effect on religiosity in youth and young adults.

agree more

disagree more

started

stopped
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Cross-sectional Analysis
In addition to the change-in-change models, cross-tabulations from the data in
Wave III were used to examine whether or not a relationship existed between non-deviant
secular behaviors and the same eight measures of religiosity. However, because these
analyses are only cross-sectional, causality cannot be established. These variables had to
be analyzed cross-sectionally because they do not appear in Wave I and Wave II of the
NSYR.
Two of the secular variables were significantly related to religiosity. The first
secular variable was SOCNET4 (About how often do you visit social networking sites?)
and was coded as 1 (several times a day), 2 (about once a day), 3 (three to five days a
week), 4 (one to two days a week), 5 (every few weeks), and 6 (less than every few
weeks). The second secular variable was MATER4, which asks whether respondents get a
lot of pleasure respondents gain from shopping and buying things. It was recoded as 1
(strongly agree), 2 (agree), 3 (disagree), and 4 (strongly disagree). Of the eight religiosity
measures, SOCNET4 was significantly related to FAITH1 and MATER4 was
significantly related to every variable excluding OKAYPICK.
Respondent’s social media habits didn’t seem to have a dramatic impact on the
importance of faith in their daily lives in terms of overarching trends. The chi-square
value of the relationship was .011 with 1,973 valid responses, with respondents being
most likely to report faith as somewhat important in shaping their daily lives in every
category except the one for respondents who use social media less than every few weeks.
For that category, respondents were most likely to report faith being very important in
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shaping their daily lives. Despite social media habits, however, all respondents were more
likely to say their faith was important to them than not important. The data are below.
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Levels of pleasure gained from the purchase of goods was also significantly
related to importance of faith in daily life, with a chi-square value of .022 and 2,499 valid
cases. Within this relationship, all groups except the ones who reported getting no
pleasure from buying items were most likely to say that faith was somewhat important in
how they live their daily lives. Respondents who reported getting no pleasure from
purchasing things were most likely to report faith being not very important in shaping
their daily lives. Interestingly, however, those who reported getting the most pleasure
from buying things were the least likely to say that religion was extremely important in
shaping their daily lives.
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All other relationships shown to be significant at the .05 level between
materialism and the religious variables (SPIRITUA, GODCLOSE, MORALREL,
RELPRVT, MORALCHNG, UNMARSEX) followed similar trends where all groups
tended to agree. All groups agreed that religion should be kept out of public affairs, were
more likely to say morality is not relative and there are definite rights and wrongs, but
that morality should shift along with a changing world. Respondents across all degrees of
materialism also reported feeling there was nothing wrong with unmarried sex. When it
came to whether or not they identified as “spiritual but not religious,” respondents in
categories 1, 2, and 3, which accounts for everyone except the least materialistic, were
most likely to say that was somewhat true, while the least materialistic were most likely
to say that statement was not true at all for them. The least materialistic respondents were
also substantially more likely to report feeling extremely close to god than any other
group.
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Chapter 4: Discussion
This study has extended previous research by utilizing longitudinal data to
examine causality between multiple religious and secular behaviors and whether or not it
is secular behavior that affects religiosity and not the more commonly thought of
converse. It has also identified a possible source of causality within the secular sphere
other than deviant behavior, which has not been studied by prior researchers.
One of the most interesting trends that can be gathered from these data is also one
of the most innocuous: that across every cross tabulation and nearly every category
within those cross tabulations, the mode was 0, or no change. When comparing measures
of religiosity against deviant secular behaviors, one would expect that an increase in
secular behavior would mean a decline in religiosity, but that does not seem to be the
case.
Part of this may be due to the fact that those engaging in deviant behaviors
already have lower levels of religiosity, and therefore do not change much compared to
peers who did not initially engage in these deviant behaviors. What seems to be more
likely, however, is that although many studies have focused on how deviant behavior
drives down measures of religiosity (Desmond, Ulmer, and Bader 2013; Perry and
Hayward 2017; Thompson and Jang 2016), deviant behavior does not appear to be one of
the main forces that affects religiosity.
If this is the case, the question then becomes what really is driving down
religiosity measures. One possibility is that the decline is due to increased secular
behaviors relating to the rise of mass media and popular culture and therefore are not
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categorized as deviant. Social media usage and consumerism could be accounting for a
portion of change in religiosity measures, but have not been examined by previous
studies. This is shown particularly in the correlations between the reported amount of
pleasure respondents get from shopping and buying items and seven of the eight
measures of religiosity that were examined in this study.
Change in reported importance of faith in daily life in cross tabulations with both
change in drinking habits and change in smoking habits showed faith becoming slightly
less important across almost every category, which is interesting when compared to the
general trends of responses to just the importance of faith to respondent’s daily lives over
time, which also declined slightly. Looking at this, the question becomes in spite of the
statistical relationship between the importance of faith and drinking and smoking, do
these deviant behaviors really have any distinct effect on religiosity, or does the general
trends of religiosity change account for most of the change in the relationship? Without
having other non-deviant secular behaviors to analyze alongside the deviant ones, it is
difficult to say conclusively.
This same trend of the change in change models mimicking the trends seen in just
the religious variables continues when looking at the tables comparing drinking and
smoking habits to opinions about whether or not morality should change along with the
world. A net score of 0 is still the most likely for every category in each table, but after
that almost every category was most likely to agree that morality needs to shift with a
changing world. This is the same trend that we see in the frequencies, which show that as
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respondents age they are more likely to say that morality should shift along with the
world.
There were a few categories that did not follow the general trend, however. They
were category 4 of drinking, which indicates a substantial increase in drinking frequency
between Wave I and Wave II, and those who started smoking between Wave I and Wave
II (-1). Both were more likely to disagree more over time that morality should not shift
along with the world. These are strange categories to stick out, because both indicate an
increased level of deviant secular behavior along with higher scores of religiosity..
Change in smoking habits and opinions on whether or not morality was relative
had some slight variation in the mode across the different categories of secular behavior.
While for those who started smoking or whose smoking habits remained consistent it was
most likely that there was no change in religious behavior, those who stopped smoking
were equally as likely to report no change in religiosity as they were to be slightly more
likely to disagree more than previously that morals are relative and there is no true right
or wrong.
The topic of unmarried sex is one that is frowned upon by many religions and is
explicitly taught to young people growing up in the church as a sin. However, when
looking at opinions about the acceptability of unmarried sex over time, it is shown that
while it is most likely for religiosity opinions to not change over time despite deviant
behavior, respondents are also more likely to be more approving as they age regardless of
whether they started or stopped smoking. This again echoes the frequency table for this
variable, which shows a growing approval of unmarried sex across Wave II and Wave III.
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Particularly in this relationship, where every category reaches the same conclusions, it
becomes clear that there is something more than deviant behavior informing these
religiosity trends.
Perhaps most interestingly of all the change in change model data was that
marijuana usage was not significantly related with any of the eight chosen measures of
religiosity. Marijuana is the most deviant of the three behaviors examined in this study, as
smoking and drinking, while considered deviant for youth, both become legal at a certain
age (18 for smoking and 21 for drinking). Marijuana has seen legalization in certain
states over the past few years but is still illegal in the eyes of the federal government for
people of all ages. So, if as much research proposes, it is deviant behavior that negatively
effects religiosity, then marijuana usage should have been significant across the most
measures of religiosity, not the least. In this context, the fact that smoking, which
considering the age range of the respondents in the NSYR would be legal for the highest
proportion of respondents, was the deviant secular behavior that was significant with the
most measures of religiosity seems odd and counterintuitive.
Because most of the data collected in the change in change models is consistent in
its conclusions about religiosity despite the different levels of engagement in deviant
secular behavior, deviance cannot be the only factor in play in driving down religiosity
measures. Other cultural forces must be at play in the lives of these youth that are
changing their opinions on these religious matters. The most likely factor would be the
mass media, whose expansive influence on society is already being examined in terms of
civil religion and broader religious influence (Jindra 2000; Lynch 2008; Price 2000;
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Thompson 2000), and which was shown to be influential in cross-sectional examinations
within this study. Youth in particular are more engaged with the mass media than ever,
primarily due to the fact that mass media richly saturates our culture in recent years due
to the rise of the information age and the easy accessibility of the internet to most youth.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
While there are significant relationships between deviant behaviors and various
measures of religiosity, these relationships seem to run almost entirely parallel with
simple frequencies of the religiosity measures on their own, which raises the question of
whether or not the deviant behavior is really the driving factor in religiosity change. This
is an interesting question because it hasn’t been widely examined before.
Researchers have tended to look at the relationships in terms of religious behavior
affecting secular behaviors, not the other way around, but there does seem to be some
cultural component affecting religiosity that studies have not found yet. Considering the
massive cultural shift that the digital age has brought about, it is time to consider that
maybe our causality model is outdated and that it could in fact be secular forces
informing religious beliefs and behaviors in modern society. This would constitute a
massive shift in the way we frame religion in modern society and would demonstrate a
need for religion as an institution to change how it interacts with and reaches out to its
members.
If indeed causality flows in the direction of secular behavior influencing religious
behavior, then our whole framework for understanding religious trends in society is
fatally flawed. Because society tends to look to religion as a place where people develop
morality and beliefs, misunderstanding the significance of religion as an institution could
lead to an inability to understand and address where cultural morality and belief is truly
coming from, which would be problematic for those looking to address issues they see
with popular morality and thinking. It is also important for those involved in religious
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hierarchies themselves to understand what is going on with their members so they can
best service the social, emotional, and spiritual needs of their congregations.
This study only examined three deviant secular behaviors, and then only
examined them in the context of youth and young adults. While the longitudinal data
provided by the National Study of Youth and Religion (NSYR) are valuable, it does
present limits in that many of its secular variables did not appear until Wave III, and
therefore could not be used in the change in change models utilized by this paper. This is
in part because of when the first two waves of the study took place —- 2003 and 2005 —
and the massive changes our society has seen even since then in terms of the
development and growth of social media and its usage and the prevalence of technology
as an irreplaceable tool in everyday society.
There is a need for more data to be collected in this longitudinal fashion about
these secular forces so that they can be utilized in causality models. A nationally
representative longitudinal dataset would also be useful in further exploration of this
topic as it would let researchers compare trends across the entire population and not only
youth and young adults.
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